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The Fiscal Covenant. Strengths, Weaknesses, Challenges is the latest in a series of
documents produced during the 1990s on the theme, “Changing production patterns with
social equity”. Like the other documents in the series, it offers guidelines for the present and
future development of Latin America and the Caribbean. This time the issue addressed is that
of public-sector finances.
The purpose of the present publication is to disseminate more widely the first
chapter of The Fiscal Covenant. Strengths, Weaknesses, Challenges. This chapter
summarizes the main arguments of the document and provides a general idea of its contents
and proposals. The fiscal covenant is understood as being the basic sociopolitical agreement
that legitimizes the role of the State and establishes the areas and scope of government
responsibility in the economic and social spheres. Five main aspects of it are analysed: fiscal
consolidation, improved productivity of public expenditure, transparency of public




It is a well-known fact that the debt crisis brought about profound changes in the development
strategies of the Latin American and Caribbean countries. As it became clear that this was no
transitory event, but instead represented a lasting change in the macroeconomic climate,
emergency measures rapidly evolved into structural adjustment programmes designed to
promote economic reforms compatible with the new conditions.
Beginning in the 1980s, then, the Latin American and Caribbean economies, with
varying degrees of intensity, undertook wide-ranging structural reforms, among them trade
liberalization and economic integration; opening the economy up to foreign investment; price
deregulation; financial deregulation; greater labour market flexibility; privatization,
divestiture and capitalization of public enterprises; a change in the model for financing social
security pensions; and fiscal decentralization, especially in the provision of social services in
the areas of health care and education.
To a great extent, the crisis of the 1980s represented a turning point in the view of
the State as an actor in the development process. As a result, the reorientation of regional
development has centred on the revision of the role assigned to the State, entailing a
fundamental re-shaping of the fiscal regime. In many countries, for example, privatization and
modernization have brought in an extraordinary level of revenues in the short term and
reductions in public expenditure and public-sector employment in the long term, while
intensifying calls for an adequate system for regulating the privatized services.
Decentralization has altered the distribution of resources and responsibilitie  among the
various levels of government and, hence, the structure of intra-governmental transfers. Trade
liberalization has necessitated a shift in the tax structure towards domestic taxes (primarily
on consumption, in the form of a value added tax). Meanwhile, deregulation of the financial
system —designed to promote the development of national capital markets— has, in some
cases and to varying degrees, facilitated a change in the social security funding model from
pay-as-you-go to funded systems, incidentally expanding the sources of domestic financing
for both government and the private sector, including, potentially, private infrastructure
projects.
The new external context created by globalization and the striking increase in
subregional trade agreements has added new challenges without eliminating those already in
evidence. Globalization has accentuated the integration and interdependence of markets,
imposing a certain discipline on macroeconomic policy and public finances in response to the
increased mobility of short-term financial capital. Moreover, the sharp increase in
subregional integration and commercial complementarity agreements generates certain
constraints with regard to tariff levels, obliging forcing countries to adjust gradually to lower
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customs revenues and to deal with new challenges in administering tariffs and rationalizing
the resulting levels of effective protection.
These two trends taken together —a conjunction that has given rise to the approach
known as “open regionalism”1— have tended to reduce the autonomy of national authorities
in making and carrying out decisions, particularly in the realms of domestic economic policy
and fiscal policy. Recently, as the Asian financial crisis has underscored the disciplinary
effect of the market, national economic authorities have been forced to pay ever closer
attention to the kind of signals they are sending out in terms of stability and consistency
through their chosen mix of fiscal, monetary and foreign-exchange policies and their
management of the public debt.2
Now, some 15 years later, it can be unequivocally stated that the region has made
significant progress in terms of its public finances. For most of the countries, government
finances are no longer the cause of imbalances, but actually contribute to macroeconomic
stability. Indeed, the magnitude of the fiscal adjustment undertaken in the region and the
speed with which it has been accomplished constitute a striking achievement. Fiscal
adjustment has been a major contributor to the current state of macroeconomic stability,
absent for many decades, and a key factor in the region’s relatively strong performance in the
face of the external turbulence that began in late 1997. In addition, progress has been made in
the institutional arrangements for fiscal management, and this has eased the countries’
adjustment to the demands of globalization by paving the way for forms of public debt and
deficit management that are more compatible with international patterns of budgetary
discipline.
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the region has resolved its fiscal problems and
need only persist in its current approach for a reasonable period of time. On the contrary,
myriad economic problems and crises —in many cases limited in intensity and ultimately
brought under control, but crises nonetheless— have created an overall impression of
fragility and suggest that fiscal balance and its contribution to general macroeconomic
equilibrium are still constantly at risk, and that recent achievements in this regard must be
firmly consolidated before there are any grounds for complacency. Another cause for concern
are the banking crises which are becoming more frequent as the volatility of capital flows
increases in the absence of adequate prudential regulation and whose costs are potentially
much greater than those of traditional fiscal crises.
It is clear, moreover, that because of the exigencies of the crisis, most of the
countries’ efforts have gone into reaching and maintaining financial equilibrium, and scant
attention has been paid to other possible objectives of fiscal policy, including some on which
there is considerable consensus. Social equity goals, for example, generally received short
                                                
1 ECLAC (1994).
2 The drastic fiscal adjustment undertaken by Brazil in November 1997 in response to the serious
instability and domestic stock market slump caused by the Asian crisis in October and November of that
year is an example of the limits imposed on the autonomy of economic authorities by the discipline of
financial markets. The purpose of adjustments like Brazil’s, which was to some extent preventive, is to
build up a reputation for solvency, prudence and budgetary discipline, thereby establishing credibility
in financial markets, in order to avoid speculative attacks on the local currency and ensure continuity in
the pace and terms of net capital inflows.
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shrift during the 1980s in the design of the tax structure and the composition of public
expenditure, although the present decade has seen significant improvements in the latter
respect. Moreover, efforts to improve the transparency of public accounts, to develop a new
style of results-based government management and to promote a fuller debate of the budget
within a democratic framework have been insufficient, to say the least.
These considerations form the basis for the underlying thesis of this document,
namely, that the strength or weakness of public finances reflects the strength or weakness of
the “fiscal covenant” that legitimizes the role of the State and the scope of government
responsibilities in the economic and social spheres. The absence of a generally accepted
model of what the State’s goals should be undercuts any possibility of consensus on the
amount of resources it should manage, the sources of its revenues and the rules for allocating
and utilizing them. An explicit or implicit political agreement between the various sectors of
society as to what the State should do, on the other hand, helps to legitimize the amount,
composition and orientation of public expenditure and the tax burden necessary to finance it.
The success of the profound transformation of the economy that is now taking place,
as outlined in general terms in the foregoing paragraphs, will falter if the State is not in a
position to make its essential contribution. Privatization of public utilities, for example, must
be accompanied by effective regulation; accumulated human capital and quality
infrastructure are essential to economic growth; and equity in the distribution of the fruits of
development is necessary to the political and social stability required for stable growth. But
the State cannot systematically and efficiently carry out its functions if the fiscal covenant is
not operative. There is a tremendous need, then, to reconstruct and renew the fiscal covenant.
This is undoubtedly an enormous task politically and technically; but, as this analysis
attempts to show, the elements required to undertake it are at hand, and it is therefore not
only necessary but possible.
Indeed, an understanding and debate of many of the components of a new fiscal
covenant are already in evidence, and the main effort required is to push ahead with the task
and articulate it clearly, on the technical front, and to build a social consensus, on the
political front. The section that follows offers some thoughts on the most important
components, while the remainder of the chapter delineates the inroads that has been made in
each of these areas and the policies that might be conducive to further progress.
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B.  MAIN ELEMENTS OF A NEW FISCAL COVE NANT
Despite the significant steps many countries have taken in reforming their fiscal institutions,
policies and administrative procedures, in general it is fair to say that they have not gone far
enough to enable the Governments of the region to deal confidently with the challenges they
face both internally and globally as the century comes to a close. Consolidating the notable
fiscal progress made in recent years will require a lasting consensus on a fiscal system
capable of harmonizing macroeconomic stability with other public responsibilities in terms of
growth and distribution. That, in turn, requires a consensus on the scope, composition and
orientation of public expenditure and taxation over the medium term. In the absence of solid
agreement on these points, equilibrium can be undermined by the reappearance of
destabilizing fiscal, and ultimately macroeconomic, pressures, which may sometimes
manifest themselves through non-transparent mechanisms. Hence, fiscal consolidation is the
first element in any new fiscal covenant. It should also be mentioned at this point, both
because of its intrinsic importance and because the State is the main social agent in a
position to do something about it, that fiscal consolidation should allow for the possibility of
action in the face of fluctuations in economic activity caused by domestic or external factors.
Private economic agents will benefit if the macroeconomic environment does not undergo
sudden shifts or shocks, and fiscal policy has some useful instruments to offer in that regard.
This effort must be undertaken in an environment in which civil society demands that
when the public sector acts, it should in principle be as efficient as market forces in the
allocation of resources. It follows that raising the productivity of public expenditure is an
essential ingredient of the type of fiscal covenant that would be satisfactory to society. Some
of the approaches that are being developed to respond to society’s demands are: reassigning
the functions of various public institutions; introducing clear criteria to improve the efficacy,
efficiency and quality of the civil service; and involving new agents, subject to appropriate
regulation, in providing infrastructure and social services traditionally considered the purview
of the State.
The success of any attempt at macroeconomic adjustment —and this point is closely
related to the others just discussed— depends on the capacity to account in detail for the
revenue and expenditure involved. Another reason for close monitoring is to ensure that
expenditure is productive. Accountability is therefore essential to the democratic agreements
that underlie sound fiscal practice. In this regard, as will be examined in some detail in
subsequent sections of the document, the recent history of the public sector in the region,
providing as it does many examples of a lack of transparency in public finances and in
government action in general, inspires serious concern. Not infrequently, quasi-fiscal
operations that were inadequately reported or accounted for have caused hidden fiscal
imbalances to explode in the authorities’ faces. Society has been left with the impression that
some social groups have unjustly benefited and others have been wronged by operations
conducted behind the scenes which have, moreover, exacerbated the inefficiency of public
agencies. It would therefore be difficult for a new, operative fiscal covenant to take shape
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unless it reflected the explicit intention, and was equipped with definite mechanisms, to
endow fiscal action with the utmost transparency.
Although the countries of the region have almost universally opted for a market-
based system of production, in which individuals can fully realize their potential and exercise
their initiative, the notion still strongly persists in all of them that the type of progress that is
truly worthwhile is progress as a society, that is, the simultaneous advancement of
individuals united by common civic values and a relationship of solidarity, who understand
that collective progress is not antagonistic to individual progress, but rather complements and
reinforces it. One of the most important manifestations of solidarity is the idea that at any
given point in the life of a nation there is a certain minimum level of equity that society is
responsible for ensuring. Society usually entrusts the State in particular with a crucial role in
the promotion of social equity, and a fiscal covenant would be incomplete and
unsatisfactory if that role were not provided for or were ignored or inadequately performed.
Important aspects of that role are the promotion of equal opportunity, as expressed, for
example, in education, health care and employment, and the task of protecting vulnerable
members of society; nor should equity in the Government’s collection of the resources it
needs to perform these and other tasks be left out of the reckoning.
Lastly, it should be recalled that the countries of the region are becoming
increasingly committed to the values of democracy, and strengthening those values is a
concern shared by virtually all social sectors. The fiscal covenant not only needs democratic
institutions in order to work; it is also an essential contributor to the strength of those
institutions. The norms of democratic coexistence can only be benefited by a process of
debate from which commitments emerge that represent a broad consensus as to the scope and
composition of public expenditure and its funding and provide for proper controls on public
management. This exercise in democracy must involve the real —and not just the formal—
participation of the legislature and the branches of the national Executive, the authorities of
subnational levels of government, and civil society as a whole, through the channels
appropriate for each.
A new fiscal covenant that consolidates the reforms now in progress, thus promoting
a stable macroeconomic environment; that commits government to using resources efficiently;
that provides for transparent mechanisms of public action; that makes social equity a priority
objective; that strengthens democratic institutions —such a covenant is a prerequisite if the
region is to make further progress towards its goal of changing production patterns with
social equity. The remaining sections of this chapter, as well as the rest of the report, seek to
contribute to the debate on the nature of this new covenant.
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C.  FISCAL CONSOLIDATION
It is well known that large fiscal deficits on the accounts of the central government and non-
financial public sector in the first half of the 1980s created inflationary pressures and external
imbalances in many countries of the region. For that reason, fiscal consolidation has
constituted the centerpiece of the stabilization and later the adjustment plans adopted by
Latin American and Caribbean countries over the past two decades.
Progress in this area has been considerable. For the region as a whole, public
finances are on a far sounder footing than they used to be, and this is reflected in
substantially smaller deficits and much more careful deficit and debt management. In the
1980s, adjustment essentially took the form of reduced spending. In the 1990s, it has tended
to involve revenue enhancement in the Latin American countries, allowing for a return to
higher levels of spending; this recovery is not yet evident in the Caribbean countries,
however, which have generally maintained a tendency to reduce spending (see figure I-1).
Figure I-1
OVERALL BALANCE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
(Percentage of GDP)
1.a Latin America 1.b Caribbean




























































The need to place such a high priority on the fiscal component of macroeconomic
stabilization meant that other objectives of public finance were put on the back burner. The
most seriously neglected aspect of all was undoubtedly the distributive function of
government.3 In effect, the objective of equity —chiefly vertical equity— was largely left out
of consideration in the design and implementation of public policy in general and fiscal
policy in particular. In recent years, many Governments have adopted measures, particularly
in the area of social expenditure, that reflect a growing awareness of the seriousness of the
social problems that have built up over many years, especially since the 1980s. As will be
discussed later, that awareness has resulted in a marked resumption of social spending in
Latin America, a trend not shared by the Caribbean countries.
The favourable trend in public accounts obscures, however, a number of phenomena
that suggest that the achievement is still fragile. By recording proceeds from privatization
above the line even though they are, strictly speaking, non-recurrent revenues, some countries
have tended to overestimate the solidity of their adjustment. Another problem is that public
finances have become more dependent on the economic cycle, a tendency that makes for
instability in expenditure and threatens the durability of the fiscal adjustment. An expansion
in spending based on a transitory swelling of tax revenues and easy access to external
financing during an upswing of the economy is followed by sharp spending cuts when the
revenues and financing evaporate. Inadequate regulation of quasi-fiscal operations has
resulted in sharp imbalances in a number of countries, the outstanding examples in this
decade being those associated with banking crises. Decentralization has brought new
challenges and in some countries has become a major source of fiscal imbalance. Lastly,
despite deficit reduction, the public debt burden remains high.
In the following pages, two aspects of fiscal consolidation are analysed: first, the
trend in public revenues and, second, government deficits and debt. Trends in expenditure are
analysed in section D.
1.  Public revenue: incomplete progress
Since the mid-1980s, all Governments in the region have to some degree made substantial
reforms in their tax and tariff regimes, supplemented by other reforms aimed at modernizing
tax administration. Despite major differences between one situation and the next, in general it
can be said that their extraordinary efforts to implement tax reforms have contributed to an —
as yet modest— increase, in the tax ratio in Latin America (though not in the Caribbean) and
to substantial improvements in tax structure and administration. There is, to be sure, great
variety in the level and composition of public revenues from one country to the next, owing
to differences in income levels, production structures, trade integration and tax policies and
administration (see chapter III).
The average size of the public sector in the region, as measured by revenues, is
moderate and clearly smaller than in the OECD and Asian countries. Average total central
government revenue in Latin America increased slightly from a little less than 15% of GDP in
                                                
3 Evidence of increasing inequality in income distribution in most countries of the region,
particularly in urban areas, is presented in ECLAC (1997a), chapter I.
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1990 to 17% in 1996 (see figure I-1); most of the countries fell into the 15%-20% range, and
only Haiti and Guatemala collected less than 10%. Including the non-financial public sector,
total receipts rose from 25.5% of GDP in 1990 to nearly 28% in 1996, and the countries’
convergence towards levels above 20% of GDP increased. In the Caribbean, average total
central government revenue fell slightly in the 1990s but, even so, held at over 30% of GDP.
In this context, the national government tax take (excluding social security contributions)
increased from 11.8% in 1990 to 13.6% in 1996 in Latin America, while dropping from
29.5% to 27.2% in the Caribbean. Although the average tax ratio for Latin America as a
whole exceeded the figure for 1980, half the countries in the region had a tax burden lower
than in 1980.
The level of social security contributions makes a big difference in comparisons of
the tax burden across regions. The tax burden in the OECD countries was 38% of GDP in
1995, of which social security contributions accounted for nine points, so that the effective
tax burden, net of social security contributions, was somewhat over 29% of GDP. Social
security contributions average 2% of GDP in Latin America, and, as just indicated, the tax
take net of these contributions averages 13.6% of GDP. In any case, social security is only
one of many factors contributing to the heterogeneity in tax levels characteristic of the region,
which reflect, among other elements, the effectiveness of tax systems, decisions as to the size
of government and the option open to some countries of financing public expenditure with oil
revenues (see figure I-2). These comparisons also reveal the great potential that exists in
many countries, particularly in Latin America, for increasing taxation without affecting their
competitiveness.
With respect to the structure of trade, liberalization and integration have drastically
reduced the mean level and variance of tariff revenues and hence the importance of foreign
trade taxes to government financing, especially in the large and medium-sized countries of
Latin America. These phenomenon is a source of fiscal concern to the small Caribbean
economies, however, which derive roughly one third of total revenues from foreign trade. To
a lesser extent, this trend is also observable in Central America; consequently, in both these
areas the prospects for subregional economic integration depend heavily on the consolidating
of new sources of fiscal revenue.
Tax systems have changed considerably since the early 1980s in many other respects
as well. The number of tax bases has been reduced, and there has been a shift in the
territorial and functional basis of taxation away from tariffs and towards domestic taxes, and
away from direct taxes and towards indirect taxes. The tendency to rely increasingly on value
added tax (VAT) not only favours allocative neutrality, but allows for an increase in the
sectoral coverage of indirect taxation, thereby reducing exemptions and making it easier to
control evasion. With respect to income tax, the threshold limit of income subject to tax has
been raised, the number of brackets have been reduced and the maximum marginal tax rates
have been lowered for both individuals (from 47% to 28% on average) and companies
(43.3% to 35.5%). In addition, there has been more widespread use of presumptive criteria
for taxation in some industries in order to reduce evasion.
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Figure I-2
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TAX RECEIPTSa  : 1996
(Percentage of GDP)
2.a Latin America 2.b Caribbean
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a Net of social security contributions.
b Figures from 1995.
c Figures from 1992.
d Figures from 1993.
The tendency to abandon direct taxes as means of revenue has, however, been carried
somewhat too far in Latin America. In OECD countries, for example, 65% of tax receipts
come from direct taxes (fourth fifths of that from personal income tax), while in Latin
America direct taxes account for only 25% of tax receipts (most of that from corporate
income taxes). Most countries in the region collect only between 20% and 30% of their tax
revenues from direct taxes. Only Colombia, Mexico and Panama have a more balanced
structure, with direct taxes accounting for between 40% and 50% of all tax revenues. The tax
structure in the Caribbean is closer to the OECD pattern than to Latin America’s: on average
direct taxes account for 40% of tax revenues in this subregion, and a number of countries
(Aruba, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Netherlands Antilles, Suriname and Trinidad and
Tobago) have exceeded that percentage in the last 15 years.
Proceeds from privatization since the end of the 1980s have brought the region some
US$ 76 billion at 1990 prices. The extent of privatization has varied from one country to the
next, but the pattern has been the same: a flood of privatization at the start and subsequent
slowing as the number of enterprises available for sale drops off. The sales proceeds
constitute only the short-term fiscal impact, however. The long-term effects, which are
discussed in chapter IX, have not been adequately quantified.
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Tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax expenditure continue to be the weak points in
revenue collection. They cannot easily be explained as the result of excessive taxation, since
there appears to be a positive correlation in the region between higher tax rates and tax
collection efficiency. In the case of VAT, in particular, countries with comparatively high
rates, such as Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, also have relatively high rates of tax efficiency,
while the opposite is true in countries with low rates, such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay.
This suggests two things: first, that the quality of tax administration is a critical determinant
of collection levels, and, second, that good administration can more than compensate for any
disincentive to comply that might result from higher rates. Hence the prime importance of
strengthening tax administration in programmes to control tax evasion and avoidance.
Reforms of the tax administration apparatus have been directed towards raising its
place in the bureaucratic hierarchy and increasing the technical autonomy of the tax and
customs services. There has also been a tendency to concentrate the regulatory functions in
the national tax bureau, while decentralizing the operational functions of collections and
auditing to subnational units or governments. Although there is also a tendency to merge tax
and customs offices, and even one instance (Argentina) in which the revenue service is also
responsible for social security contributions, this trend is somewhat less marked. Lastly,
there have been widespread efforts to streamline administrative rules and procedures and to
incorporate modern information technologies into the processing and auditing of tax returns
and tax collection and refund procedures in an effort to reduce collection costs and improve
the productivity of revenue services.
To sum up, while important steps have been taken in the area of tax reform, in most
countries they fall short of meeting the classic objectives of revenue adequacy, the
streamlining of rules and procedures, neutrality in resource allocation and equitable
distribution of the tax burden. Overall, tax performance indicators reveal a marginal
improvement in terms of revenue adequacy, but high rates of evasion, avoidance and tax
expenditure persist, and the issue of vertical equity has faded from the tax debate. There is
thus a need to persevere in reforms aimed at boosting public revenues. Some possible
courses of action are briefly sketched below:
(a) Place priority on four key approaches to boosting revenue: combat evasion,
increase direct taxation, introduce green taxes and tax some financial
transactions
International  comparisons  show that the  mean tax ratio in Latin  America is low —
this is not the case in the Caribbean— and that many countries have ample margin for raising
public revenues. For both economic and political reasons, in this regard priority should be
given to a strategy to combat various forms of tax evasion by improving tax administration
capabilities. This will send out a clear signal to economic agents and to society as a whole
that, just as obeying the law is a requirement of life in a democracy, so full compliance with
the tax code is essential if the fiscal covenant underlying economic and political governance
is to work. In addition, the above analysis suggests that there is ample margin for increasing
direct taxation (especially personal income tax) in most Latin American countries. Just as
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combating evasion would increase horizontal equity, the latter reform would improve vertical
equity. Another possibility is to expand the use of “green taxes”, that is, taxes that promote
environmental protection, an innovation that has only recently begun to be introduced in the
region. In addition to these sources of revenue, another option is to tax certain financial
transactions, especially those of a speculative nature; such taxes should, however, be applied
within a framework of international procedures and institutional arrangements that call for
similar tax burdens to be imposed on such operations in all countries, so that they will not
cause a diversion of capital flows. For any of these measures to be politically viable,
revenue enhancement must be closely tied to greater productivity in expenditure and to
institutional practices that minimize opportunities for corruption.
(b) Persist in efforts to streamline the tax system and its administration in order to
minimize evasion and avoidance
By reducing the number of tax bases, some of which have a low yield, Governments
can reduce the compliance costs to taxpayers and hence the incentive to avoid or evade
complying with their obligations. A tax regime characterized by broad bases and uniform
rates is less vulnerable to evasion —chiefly because it is easier for the tax office to
monitor— than a system that features multiple exemptions, deductions or differential rates.
Moreover, simplifying the tax system cuts down on the amount of information required and
the need for complicated tax procedures, which tend to encourage avoidance or evasion.
Streamlining should also be accompanied by a consolidation of jurisdictions with regard to
any given tax base, since when responsibilities are divided between different levels of
government (as happens in Brazil), control becomes more difficult.
(c) Reduce the welter of tax incentives and thus the amount of tax revenue
foregone (“tax expenditure”)
Tax incentives introduce opacity into the design and implementation of fiscal policy,
since Governments generally lack good, current estimates of the volume of tax revenue they
are foregoing and are unaware of who primarily benefits. The lack of transparency that
characterizes “these tax expenditures” is closely linked to the considerable discretion
Governments have in allocating tax concessions, a circumstance that tends to turn them into
vehicles for rent-seeking and corruption. Hence, the use of tax incentives not only undercuts
revenue adequacy, but may often jeopardize the principle of equity as well. The potentially
regressive nature of such mechanisms can, in fact, neutralize the redistributive efforts the
Government is making through other policy instruments, whether these are tax measures or
fiscal actions in general.
The classic argument for such exemptions is that they bias the allocation of
resources towards selected sectors or regions with the economic authorities wish to promote.
Since, however, Governments generally do not know what amount of resource is being
channelled towards the beneficiaries and do not evaluate the results of the exemption
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programme, it is generally unclear whether or not their objectives are being accomplished. If
the aim is justified, it would usually be more efficient to pursue the same objective by
explicitly allocating resources in the budget, an approach that also makes it easier to evaluate
the efficiency of the expenditure. In the absence of such a decision, at the least an estimated
tax-expenditure budget should be drawn up along with the regular budget for the
consideration of the legislature; this has the added virtue of ensuring greater transparency in
fiscal management (see section E below on transparency in public expenditure).
(d) Do not make the generation of public revenues the chief goal of privatization
Because they are non-recurrent, the public revenues generated by privatizations
should not be the main objective of the process. It is essential, in particular, to avoid using
privatization proceeds to finance current expenditure. The region’s experience shows that the
most efficient use of the proceeds is to buy back public debt at a discount on secondary
markets, whenever possible.
2.  Deficit, debt and new macroeconomic challenges for fiscal policy
For the first seven years of the current decade, the average central government deficit for
19 countries of the region never exceeded 2% of GDP. This is proof of a remarkable
exercise in fiscal restraint, especially in comparison with the period prior to the debt crisis,
when the average deficit was close to 8% of GDP (see figure I-1 and chapter V). This is a
spectacular achievement at the international level and one that surpasses the record of much
of the industrialized world over the same period.
All the traditional indicators —borrowing requirements, primary deficit and current
saving— have shown further improvement in the 1990s, especially in those countries which
were in a weaker position at the beginning of the deca e. With the exception of Chile,
however, they have not managed to sustain overall surpluses; and in some cases their fiscal
position remains precarious (Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Haiti nd Honduras), despite
attempts by the authorities of most of these countries to address the problem in recent years.
Moreover, in the last few years, public accounts have tended to deteriorate somewhat. In
1996, for example, 15 out of the 19 countries for which information was available recorded a
deficit.
This points to a disturbing procyclical trend in public finances within the region,
which has tended to intensify rather than moderate the business cycle. In a number of
countries, the combined effect of a drastic reduction in the rate of inflation, the resumption of
growth and of external financing, and proceeds from privatization have generated a
temporarily more favourable fiscal situation than the longer-range scenario for public
finances. At times, this process has been fueled by adjustment programmes, monitored by
multilateral finance agencies, which overemphasize deficit indicators without allowing for the
impact of the economic cycle. This practice leads to a relaxation of fiscal discipline in the
upswing of the cycle and requires drastic adjustments when international conditions take a
turn for the worse, such as occurred with the Mexican crisis at the end of 1994 and the
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current Asian crisis. Estimates presented in chapter IV of this report suggest that the
behaviour of government expenditure in the region is much more procyclical than in the
OECD countries and South-East Asia.
No less important are the problems associated with the costs of poorly managed
financial cycles at a time when globalization has tended to contribute to increasingly volatile
capital flows. In many cases, these crises have been associated with the liberalization of
financial variables (interest rates, bank credit or the balance-of-payments capital account)
unaccompanied by a simultaneous effort to strengthen prudential regulation and supervision
of banks and other intermediaries in order to deal with the levels of risk that can affect the
lending and investment processes in freer financial markets. A deficient prudential standard
during economic booms or deregulation processes allows financial entities to assume an
excessive level of risk; this leads to subsequent bankruptcies and costly rescue programmes,
which include loans to illiquid banks, portfolio buyouts, loan reschedulings at preferential
interest rates or, in the case of foreign loans, at preferential exchange rates, among other
measures. In a few cases, the Treasury has assumed the losses outright, but in others the
central bank has resorted to quasi-fiscal operations. Delayed intervention in such cases has
tended to increase the losses. The most costly were the bank crises in Argentina and Chile in
the early 1980s, where losses amounted to between 40% and 60% of GDP. The main
financial crises of the current decade (Mexico, Paraguay and Venezuela) have generated
fiscal or quasi-fiscal obligations equivalent to between 8% and 18% of GDP (see chapter V).
Decentralization has also given rise to considerable macroeconomic difficulties for
four basic reasons: (a) a greater emphasis in the decentralization process on revenues than on
expenditures in some countries (Brazil and Colombia); (b) the generalized use of revenue-
sharing systems which reduce the degree of freedom of tax policy, since increases in revenue
collections automatically generate higher expenditures through increases in transfers; (c) the
absence of controls on borrowing by subnational levels of governments; and (d) the lack of
incentives for regions to generate their own funds. Excessive dependence on national
transfers is one of the unfortunate features of decentralization in Latin America: these
transfers usually finance over half of local expenditures compared with one third in the
OECD countries. Given this state of affairs, efforts to improve public management through
the decentralized administration of services must be accompanied by a solution for these
macroeconomic problems, which could otherwise ultimately defeat the whole process (see
chapter VIII).
Trends in public debt also reveal significant progress, thanks mainly to the debt-
reduction programmes adopted since the late 1980s. The public debt-to-GDP ratio fell from
50% in 1988 to 30% in 1992 and then leveled off, although with major differences among
countries and significant increases in some cases. The external debt problem is far from
being resolved, however, as can be seen from the level of the region’s debt service, the high
ratio of public debt to total external debt and the fact that in many countries, both this ratio
and the external debt-to-GDP ratio are higher than in the pre-crisis years. In a few countries,
domestic debt has started to play an important role (Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and, to a
lesser extent, Argentina); this gives domestic financial markets a boost, but also at times
exerts pressures on those markets.
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In recent years, there has been a growing awareness in the region of an element of
public debt that is generally overlooked, namely pension liabilities. This has led to the
introduction of social security reforms that limit and redefine government participation in that
sphere. The impact of such reforms on public finances is considerable in terms of both the
size of the debt involved and the fiscal requirements imposed by the transition to a different
kind of pension system (see chapter VII).
A total, immediate changeover to mandatory individual savings accounts entails
recognizing two components of pension liability: (a) the present value of the pensions of
people who are already retired when the reform takes effect (pension obligations to retirees)
and (b) the present value of the contributions (or the entitlements to which they give rise)
which have been made (or accrued) up to the time the reform takes effect by those who are
still working (pension obligations to active contributors). The sum of these two values, less
the amount of reserves in the old system, gives an approximate estimate of the total implicit
pension liabilities.
Pension liabilities are high in the countries with relatively older labour forces and
populations, high contribution and replacement rates and a high participant-to-wage earner
ratio. For one group of countries, whose pension liabilities are estimated to be over 200% of
GDP (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay), the total and immediate substitution of one system for
another would demand fiscal resources equivalent to over 6% of GDP over a 40-year period
(assuming straight-line amortization and a 5% discount rate). For another group of countries
(Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba and Panama), with pension liabilities equivalent to between 90%
and 200% of GDP, fiscal resources equivalent to 2.8% and 4.6% respectively of GDP would
have to be allocated for this purpose. Other countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican
Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela) are in a better
position to finance their total pension liabilities, which range between 20% and 50% of GDP,
and would have to allocate fiscal resources equivalent to between 0.7% and 1.4% of GDP
annually.
The feasibility, from the standpoint of public finances, of carrying out a total,
immediate pension reform must be weighed by the competent authorities in each country. A
case frequently cited in the region is the Chilean experience, where financial responsibility
for the total cost of reform was assumed by the State. This cost includes: payment of the
operating deficit (to amortize obligations to retirees and pensioners); payment of recognition
bonds (to amortize liabilities accrued through past contributions made by workers who were
active contributors at the time of the reform as they arrive at retirement age or begin to draw
their pensions); payment of subsidies for minimum pensions to those who, having contributed
for the required period, still have not accumulated enough to finance the minimum pension;
and payment of welfare pensions for the indigent. These commitments have, up to now, made
far greater demands on the public purse than originally projected, and part of their financing
at the time (1981-1987) required a major adjustment in the structure of public social
expenditure, including cutbacks in the amounts available for education, health and housing
programmes. Apart from these fiscal considerations, account should be taken of the
distributional effects, especially with respect to the prorating of the fiscal cost among the
different generations of contributors and pensioners.
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In order to address the problems mentioned, four major courses of action are
proposed:
(a) Moderate the cyclical nature of public finances
The excessively procyclical management of public finances must be corrected by
restoring a stabilizing approach which focuses on medium-term trends in the economy and
fiscal variables themselves. Certainly, the validity of a countercylical approach to public
finances depends on consistency, i.e., on its operation during both phases of the cycle, saving
the excess available during boom periods in order to have reserves to fall back on in hard
times. For this purpose, it is necessary to have certain rules on expenditure and an
institutional plan that ensures fiscal symmetry throughout the cycle.
With respect to budgetary rules, it has been suggested that the growth in current
expenditure should be kept at stable levels not exceeding the trend rate of growth of the
economy by letting taxes play an active role in attenuating the fluctuations in the economic
cycle. At the institutional level, in addition to the well-known stabilization funds for the
prices of coffee (Colombia) and copper (Chile), it has been suggested that it would be
appropriate to set up a tax stabilization fund in which short-term revenues would be recorded
and accumulated during boom periods to avoid excessive cutbacks in expenditure during the
subsequent downswing. This form of management should be complemented by other
countercyclical measures for handling the public debt, particularly in relation to external
borrowing.
In this regard, Governments of the region need to pay more attention to the distinction
between the cyclical component and the structural component of the public deficit, as in the
OECD economies. For one thing, the high income elasticity of imports is an indicator of the
strong cyclical component characteristic of the current pattern of growth. Since the tax
structure has become increasingly dependent on indirect taxes, the fluctuation in revenues
from customs duties and VAT on imports suggests that traditional methods of calculation
may underestimate the importance of the cyclical component.
Careful monitoring of the cyclical and structural public-sector deficits on the basis of
standardized and timely information will facilitate fiscal debate on medium-term policy, thus
avoiding traumatic adjustments in response to cyclical variations. It would also be a means
of ensuring more stable social programmes, since public revenue or public investment could
serve as adjustment variables for the economic cycle. This approach would help to improve
the impact of social programmes, since, once the sharp fluctuations in social spending were
rectified, it would be easier to evaluate the results of these programmes and to make the
necessary corrections to enhance their effectiveness.
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(b) Prevent banking crises and, if they do occur, dilute shareholders’ equity in the
institutions involved and assume losses fiscally
Given the high fiscal and quasi-fiscal costs of banking crises, prevention efforts are
highly cost-effective for society. Experience both within the region and around the globe
suggests that a combination of a less volatile macroeconomic environment and strong
prudential regulation is particularly effective in preventing such crises. The first may be
encouraged by financial measures designed to raise the cost of short-term capital inflows
(reserve requirements on foreign liabilities) or the cost of attracting shorter-term deposits into
the financial system (higher reserve requirements on short-term deposits) and by less
procyclical fiscal management. Prudential regulation should prevent excessive exposure of
lending institutions during an upswing and ensure adequate coverage of the risks assumed by
setting even stricter requirements than those proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (given the greater financial volatility of the region) and by extending the scope of
regulation to branches and subsidiaries abroad and to the group of financial conglomerates
that make up the business unit. When crises do arise, it is essential that shareholders’ equity
in the institutions involved should be diluted in proportion to the accumulated losses and that
steps should be taken to avoid, at all costs, bailing out debtors who have engaged in
fraudulent or legally dubious practices. Governments should provide funds directly to
capitalize institutions in distress if they see fit, or to cover the quasi-fiscal losses of the
central bank, and in the latter case they should ensure that such losses do not lead to an
expansion of domestic credit.
(c) Manage the macroeconomic effects of decentralization carefully
Regional experience has shown that the first prerequisite for managing the
macroeconomic effects of decentralization is to distinguish clearly between the functions of
the central and the regional and local levels of government and to make a precise estimate of
the costs of financing them. The transfers arranged for this purpose should be de-linked from
the collection of national taxes, and preference should go to arrangements that reconcile
criteria of equity in terms of the different areas within a country, efficiency and tax effort. To
that end, four variables need to be taken into account and their relative importance weighed
on the basis of the situation in the country: target population, cost of providing decentralized
services, efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery, and level of the regional or local
tax effort. Experience also suggests that mechanisms should be set up for strict monitoring
and control of borrowing and the use of transfers. It is also important to strengthen revenue
collection capacity at the local level and technical capacity for administrative and financial
management at the regional and local levels.
A number of recent intiatives in the region have resulted in a more responsible and
coordinated management of subnational government borrowing designed to minimize adverse
macroeconomic effects and promote a better use of savings, as in Colombia, for example.
Other relevant experiences include the implementation of restructuring and fiscal adjustment
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programmes at the subnational level in some provinces of Argentina and states in Brazil and
those recently launched at the departmental level in Colombia. Under these programmes,
targets have been set for reducing the fiscal deficit by strengthening and modernizing
subnational tax bases, cutting operating costs and establishing payment commitments. There
have been successful efforts to strengthen local tax systems (property and valuation taxes).
This process must be reinforced by granting subnational governments sufficient autonomy in
administering their revenues.
(d) Monitor the fiscal impact of social security reforms
Even in the absence of financial crises which could affect the minimum guaranteed
return on pension funds, it is possible that the conversion of pension liabilities into explicit
obligations and the necessary transfers for paying minimum and welfare pensions will require
inputs of additional fiscal resources. The Chilean experience confirms this view. Hence, the
main lesson to be drawn from that experience is that the transition from one pension fund
system to another makes an enormous demand on the public purse.
Alternative reform models have been devised which combine four strategies to take
advantage of the virtues of capitalization, or funded, systems, while minimizing explicit
pension liabilities. The first strategy seeks to reduce the system’s future financial
commitments by modifying eligibility requirements and benefit formulas. The second strategy
entails only a partial changeover to a funded system by allowing a pay-as-you-go system and
a funded system to operate concurrently, dividing participants between the two systems on
the basis of fiscal or other considerations (Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay). The third strategy
consists in designing an incentive mechanism, at the lowest possible cost, to attract
individuals or cohorts to the new system. The fourth strategy entails continuing with the pay-
as-you-go system, but administering it as a notional defined-contribution system, that is, one
where each contributor has a hypothetical individual account, which is capitalized at a rate of
return roughly equal to the growth rate of the average wage on which contributions are
collected (Italy, Latvia and Sweden are using this strategy, and Costa Rica and Poland are
considering it). The information presented in chapter VII shows that in general the countries
of the region have tended to adopt a combination of the first three, as in the cases of Bolivia,
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. The fourth strategy should be the subject of
increased attention in the future.
In most cases, the type of funding is not predetermined but may consist of a
combination of current taxes, public borrowing and privatization receipts. If taxation is the
only source of financing, it places a heavy burden on most members of the generations
currently working; debt-financing, on the other hand (through government bonds), relieves the
burden on present generations and shifts the cost of the transition onto future generations.
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D.  IMPROVED PRODUCTIVITY OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
The average size of the State’s share in the economy differs considerably between subregions;
in the 1990s, it went as high as 36% of GDP in the Caribbean (central government) and 27%
in Latin America (non-financial public sector). Trends in public expenditure in the two
subregions have also diverged during the current decade. While in the Caribbean countries the
size of the central government has continued to decline, approximating OECD levels (35% of
GDP), in Latin America it has tended to increase, but still remains well below OECD and
South-East Asian levels (see figure I-3). In Latin America, a rising trend in government
spending has appeared in countries where starting levels were relatively low, whereas the
reverse has occurred in countries where the levels had been higher. Considered in conjunction
with trends observed in the Caribbean, these observations reveal some convergence in the
scale of public expenditure in the various countries of the region. It is also noteworthy that, in
those Latin American countries for which figures are available, rising expenditure has not
been accompanied by increased public-sector employment, which has actually decreased as a
proportion of non-agricultural employment during the current decade from 15.3% in 1990 to
13.0% in 1996 (see chapter IV).
Figure I-3
COMPOSITION OF TOTAL CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
(Regional averages, 1990-1996)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures and data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
International experience shows that public expenditure tends to increase with the level
of development, which suggests that it is a “superior good”. This pattern is strongly
associated with the development of social security. If we consider how expenditure patterns
have changed in the OECD countries and in Latin America, a clear trend can be seen towards





















social insurance— as per capita income increases. However, even after adjustment for that
factor, the central government is smaller in Latin America than in the OECD countries and
South-East Asia (see figure I-3).
In terms of the composition of public spending, the most noticeable trend is certainly
the upturn in social expenditure in Latin America, a trend which unfortunately has not been
seen in the Caribbean, where social expenditure still shows a slight downward trend (see
below). Similarly, while public investment has been showing signs of recovery in a number of
Latin American countries during the 1990s, it has continued to decline in the Caribbean. On
the other hand, during the current decade, most countries have seen a drop in relative level of
interest payments and spending on functions not directly related to productive and social
activities.
Military spending represents, on average, 10% of central government spending in
Latin America, or 1.9% of GDP. Both percentages are the lowest of any developing region.
Spending on public order and safety, which averages 1.3% of GDP, then needs to be added
to the above figures. It should be noted that reductions in military spending have not kept
pace with the growth of democracy and the restoration of peace in the region, which therefore
does not yet appear to have benefited from a “peace dividend”. In fact, Latin America is the
region where military spending as a percentage of GDP has fallen least during the 1990s.
This is a substantial item of expenditure, then, which for various reasons is not transparent,
tends not to be budgeted in accordance with competitive criteria, and is not subject to
adequate levels of reporting or evaluation.
Efforts to implement policies to improve the efficiency of public expenditure, while
promising, have generally proved insufficient. There is still a tendency to emphasize the size
of appropriations, rather than the efficiency, effectiveness and quality of expenditure. Despite
some pioneering attempts, efforts to encourage productivity by shifting the administrative
culture in the direction of results-based management have hardly begun. There has, however,
been some success with a number of institutional restructuring measures aimed at improving
spending efficiency through the more efficient management of public enterprises;
decentralized management of government spending, especially in the social arena, and the
design of mechanisms to enable new actors to participate in areas which have traditionally
been the preserve of the State. Progress in all these areas is a major component of the so-
called “second-generation reforms” undertaken in the countries of the region.
Growing governmental interest in the microeconomic impact of public finance has
been observed during the current decade. It is generally agreed that public spending
programmes should meet clearly-defined objectives, at the least cost and with the highest
quality possible. Consequently, new public-sector management paradigms, which incorporate
results-based administrative criteria are gaining increasing acceptance. These paradigms are
based on recognition of the right of citizens —as taxpayers and as users of public services—
to be treated as valued customers. This new management culture is associated with the
design of innovative schemes whereby government oversight agencies in a particular sector
set out the goals and results expected from the service provider concerned, sometimes in the
form of a written contract, and the attainment of the established goals is evaluated
periodically. The oversight agencies, in turn, are subject to the same process of goal-setting,
in contracts concluded with the Head of Government or the fiscal or planning bodies. In some
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cases, the beneficiaries of public expenditure (such as parents, in the case of education) are
involved in the decision-making and monitoring process. Under another method still in the
experimental stage, the remuneration of government officials has in a few cases been linked
to the fulfilment of the proposed goals and objectives. Such schemes began with pilot
projects in a number of OECD countries and have begun to be introduced in the region.
Progress in that respect has been made in Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica (see chapter X).
In the case of public-sector enterprises, there has certainly been some progress in the
rationalization of rates and charges. These improvements have helped to reduce the usual
lags in price increases caused by short-term tactics aimed at slowing inflation or easing a
distributional conflict, tactics that have invariably led to abrupt rate hikes that have a
negative impact in terms of governance. Although there are notable examples in the region of
the economically sound management of public-sector enterprises, there have been a great
many cases in which political motives have predominated in the appointment of directors and
managers and in the day-to-day running of the enterprises, and in which management has not
been transparent, thereby opening the door to various types of corruption. All the countries of
the region, including those where privatization has gone furthest over the past two decades,
have kept a number of major enterprises under State control; as a result, the administration of
those enterprises will continue to weigh heavily in terms of the efficient management of
government resources.
Fiscal decentralization has progressed in the region in response to such politi al
imperatives as the consolidation of democracy, by bringing government closer to the people,
and the objective of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditure,
particularly on social and other services whose provision does not enjoy economies of scale.
The degree of decentralization has depended not only on political decisions, but also on the
size of the country. It is a complex process, involving delicate political and economic
balances. As we have seen, some of the main difficulties have to do with the adverse
macroeconomic consequences of imperfectly designed schemes for dividing functions and
resources, inadequate transfer systems, lack of efficient control over subnational public
borrowing and the absence of opportunities or incentives for local governments to generate
their own revenues. As a later section will show, there is also the risk that decentralization
could adversely affect equity among the territorial subdivisions of a country (see
chapter VIII).
In the area of improved service delivery, it is still too early to judge, but indications
are that potential improvements are constrained by two basic factors: excessive reliance on
national resources, and over-centralization of human resources management, leaving
insufficient leeway for local authorities to manage and be accountable for services or to take
advantage of the full potential of community participation. The information available on
changes in the efficiency of expenditure —measured on the basis of indicators of cost,
impact and changes in service quality— is somewhat ambivalent, revealing both successes
and setbacks. There have been successful experiments in creating channels for citizens’
participation in budgeting and in the provision or monitoring of local services, but this
approach is still relatively undeveloped in the region as a whole.
Experience in the region suggests that privatizing public-sector enterprises leads to
improvements in management and productivity, both during the preparatory stage before the
SUMMARY 27
sale and after private agents take over. However, there are no truly comprehensive
evaluations of the sectoral effects of privatization that would make it possible to assess the
benefits to consumers in terms of the cost and quality of the privatized services. In sectors
where there are significant market failures, improvements are closely dependent on regulation
(see chapter IX).
In many countries, privatization has been accompanied by the development of
schemes to promote private-sector participation in new infrastructure projects. Apart from
regulatory issues, such schemes involve important decisions regarding Government
guarantees.4 By granting such guarantees, the Government acts as an insurer regulatory risk
force majeure, commercial risk (guarantee of minimum sales or profits) or financial exposure
(guarantee of availability of resources), and assumes contingent liabilities which may become
effective at any time. The design of such schemes determines the way in which costs are
shared between the private agent involved and the Government, and therefore influences the
distribution of the net return on the corresponding investment between that agent and the
community as a whole.
In the case of social services, there are already established mechanisms for the
participation of the private sector in social investment and emergency funds. In this area,
there are notable cases of transparent, efficient, swift and flexible management in response to
specific social needs. These funds have proved efficient in mobilizing external resources,
although there has been insufficient evaluation of the actual impact of programmes financed
by these means. It is therefore a matter of concern that most of their actions have been
oriented towards temporary relief for a limited number of vulnerable groups, rather than
towards overcoming the structural problems facing the poor, particularly the lack of the
human capital required for entry to formal labour markets. The coordination of these funds
with broader social programmes has also tended to be insufficient (see chapter VI).
In recent years, there has been increasing scope for the participation of private-
sector, charitable and community organizations in ongoing social programmes. This sphere of
activity entails the redesign of social security systems and a variety of mechanisms for
participation in the provision of education, health-care, nutrition and low-cost housing
services, among others; considerable opportunities exist for complementarity between public-
and private-sector actions that could help to upgrade such services, particularly in cases
where competition in the provision of those services is a possibility. The response of private
agents tends to be greater when the services are intended for middle- and upper-income
brackets, and are provided in cities rather than in provincial towns or rural areas. This
indicates that the public sector is not entirely substitutable as a service provider and that in
order to reach poorer segments of society, mechanisms are needed which are specifically
designed to encourage the supply of services to them, particularly through the promotion of
community organizations. In addition, the existence of proper regulatory standards is
particularly important in this area in order to avoid equity problems, as we shall see in a later
section. Problems of user information and quality control are also particularly acute in such
cases and are generally attributable to the absence of institutions to provide the necessary
information and appropriate regulatory systems for the provision of the services concerned.
                                                
4 Such guarantees are also provided in cases where existing enterprises are privatized, although
much less frequently.
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On the basis of these considerations, the following courses of action are
recommended:
(a) Promote a public management culture based upon two fundamental concepts:
the scarcity of public resources and the achievement of results
The tendency of many, perhaps most, public agents to try to solve problems in their
sectors through increases in funding shows that the concept of the scarcity of public
resources is underdeveloped. Constant attention must therefore be given to the prioritization
of items of expenditure, both across and within sectors, and to the efficiency, effectiveness
and quality of public-sector services. The shift in expenditure towards social programmes
and infrastructure should be intensified, and spending should be focused on areas where it
can make the greatest contribution to equity and growth. Consideration should be given to
possible reductions in military spending in order to take greater advantage of the “peace
dividend”.
The new results-based public management paradigm should be brought into wider
use. This requires not only institutional changes that allow for the establishment of formal
mechanisms requiring public agencies to set management objectives and goals regularly and
assess their results periodically, but also changes in informal institutions (standards, values,
customs and usages). This process is essentially an evolutionary one, and therefore requires
persistent efforts by Governments so that it will take root in the day-to-day practice of public
management. Obviously, this process must be accompanied by policies for the training of
public-sector technical personnel, within a broader policy of modernizing the State that
includes the establishment of appropriate performance incentives.
(b) Strengthen efficiency criteria in the administration of public-sector enterprises
All Governments have to judge whether, in order to achieve their goals —in the areas
of equity, resource allocation and economic growth, among others— it is preferable in
particular sectors to use State-owned enterprises to produce goods and services or to leave
that function up to the private sector, subject to indirect regulatory mechanisms. If a
Government opts for the first approach, its enterprises should be models of managerial
efficiency and transparency, in accordance with current international best practice in the
modern management of both human and financial resources. Public-sector enterprises are
therefore prime candidates for the application of the new results-based public management
paradigms and for the introduction of management contracts and periodic public evaluations
of their performance either by the regulatory agencies for the sector in question, or by a
highly specialized public-sector enterprise unit. Their managers and directors should be
selected according to criteria of professional excellence and should be subject to a regime of
incentives and sanctions based on the fulfilment of performance agreements.
An essential part of the administration of State-owned enterprises is correct
management of their prices and charges. If it is considered desirable to grant subsidies to a
particular sector, region or social group, the subsidies should be transparent and included in
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the public budget, so that they can be explicitly evaluated by the elected representatives of
society. Another alternative is to design transparent systems for the management of cross-
subsidies, such as the scheme now being developed in Colombia, under which the most
affluent social strata are required to pay to legally defined contributions, in addition to a
charge that covers the costs of providing the service; the contributions are paid into a
solidarity fund that finances the subsidies, which are also explicitly defined, for poorer social
groups.
(c) Decentralize services effectively, when deemed advisable
The major challenge of decentralization is how to combine the design of a good
funding system that will correct the above-mentioned macroeconomic problems with the
actual transfer of administrative responsibility for services to subnational levels of
government. Administrative autonomy should be extended to service providers (health
centres, schools, and the like) so that they can be accountable for their results. Regional
experience indicates that an excessively rigid system, in which subnational levels of
government and service providers do not have the necessary autonomy in terms of financial
administration or employment-related matters, does not allow for the improvements in
efficiency expected from decentralization.
Hence, institutional structures need to be designed which, in addition to furnishing
that autonomy, provide for guidance, follow-up and consistency between the decentralization
process and other governmental policies and programmes. The national Government should
strengthen its role in regulating and guiding the process, while subnational levels of
government should improve the financial administration of their resources and their technical
capacity to provide basic services more to promote community participation. This institution-
building process must be accompanied by training programmes for public employees at
various levels and a proper information system to allow for monitoring and evaluation of
transfers between levels of government and, in general, the achievement of the goals set out
in the decentralization programmes.
(d) Manage the privatization process properly
Experience in the region suggests that privatizations should be undertaken primarily
for the purpose of improving efficiency in the sectors in question. Therefore, apart from the
need for a clear definition of goals and transparency in the process, there is also a prior need
to strengthen the State’s regulatory and competition-promoting roles, particularly when the
enterprises undergoing privatization are natural monopolies or when there are significant
imperfections in their markets; this course of action prevents the improved internal efficiency
of the enterprise from being achieved at the cost of a deterioration in the operation of the
market or in consumer well-being. This requires both lowering entry barriers, whenever
possible, and avoiding transfer modalities that may lead to vertical or horizontal integration.
In the case of public-sector enterprises operating in imperfect markets, it is
sometimes feasible to restructure the enterprises beforehand, identifying the potentially
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competitive sectors and privatizing them. In those which remain under State control, private
investors can be allowed to acquire minority interests as a means of encouraging
improvements in the firms’ management.
The problem of contingent liabilities generated by government guarantees offered
under recent schemes for private-sector participation in infrastructure projects requires that
the authorities should take responsibility for monitoring, evaluating and budgeting for the
risks assumed by the State. In the first place, schemes for private-sector participation should
be designed in such a way as to limit the provision of government guarantees to those risks
which cannot be covered in the market and cannot effectively be controlled by the private
sector, thus discouraging demand for guarantees in such cases and limiting the risks to the
State. Those guarantees which are provided must be assigned a value, with an estimate of
their cost should they be called in and the degree of probability that this will occur. These
estimates, although only approximate, must be taken into account in the annual budget
debate. Furthermore, the budget should preferably include the annual cost of such liabilities,
that is, the cost of the “insurance” coverage provided to the investor by the State, and the
corresponding reserves should be transferred to the entities providing the guarantees or
deposited in a central fund administered by the Ministry of Finance. This would also tend to
cut down on the excessive use of guarantees, which are attractive because they involve the
replacement of a very costly item of government expenditure (the equivalent investment, if it
were made by the public sector) with another item having no apparent cost (the guarantee).
(e) Develop a pragmatic approach to encouraging private-sector, charitable and
community participation in the execution of social programmes
Social investment and emergency funds have proved to be an efficient mechanism for
complementary action between the public and private sectors. The promotion of such funds
should be accompanied by mechanisms to ensure their long-term financing, periodic
evaluation of the impact of their programmes and reorientation of their activities towards
overcoming structural poverty.
Regular social programmes also offer many opportunities for participation by private
enterprise and charitable and community organizations. In many cases, however, there is no
substitute for the provision of services by the State. Mixed systems with participation by
various types of agents must therefore be developed on a pragmatic basis. They must be
subject to common, appropriate regulation and to user information requirements and quality
control of the services provided. This approach takes advantage of the opportunities offered
by the competitive provision of social services, while at the same time creating instruments
for State action which have not been developed to any great extent in the past. In particular,
the design of such systems must avoid the concentration of service delivery to the most
affluent groups, with the consequent equity problems. It may be nec ssary to develop
appropriate systems to ensure that services do indeed reach the poorest segments of the
population; this could be done in various ways, including the promotion of community
organizations for that purpose.
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E.  TRANSPARENCY OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
National budgets fail to fully recognize certain government activities which have effects
analogous to the collection of taxes or the granting of subsidies yet are not subject to debate
or approval by the legislature. Such activities, known as “quasi-fiscal” operations, lead to
considerable opacity in public-sector finances and hinder efforts to determine the real
magnitude of public expenditure, its sectoral distribution and, hence, the distributional effects
stemming from government action. They also conceal the true magnitude of the tax burden
and any distortions it may cause. Consequently, quasi-fiscal operations violate the principles
of budgetary unity and universality and thus make it harder for the fiscal authorities to exert
macroeconomic control. They also contravene the principles of good governance
(transparency, responsibility and predictability) and may create an environment more
conducive to corruption (see chapter II).
The lack of transparency with which the Governments of the region conduct their
fiscal activities is largely due to political considerations. Given the absence of a
widely accepted fiscal covenant with respect to the role and size of the State and its modes
of intervention, Governments have an incentive to replace politically “costly” instruments —
taxes and the on-budget expenditures that taxes finance— with other “cheaper” tools that
operate through administrative channels and thus are not subject to the same degree of
scrutiny or opposition in the legislature. In this way, explicit subsidies are replaced by tax
concessions, lines of credit on easy terms or foreign-exchange subsidies; social expenditure
targeted at particular groups is replaced by mandatory regulations that oblige the private
sector to take on that role; and explicit budgetary assistance is replaced by government
guarantees that will be called upon in the future if certain contingencies arise. Hence, the
"price" of more transparent practices is related to the degree of difficulty the Executive may
face in establishing a political consensus with respect to the size of the tax burden or the
suitability of undertaking certain expenditures; the scope of the quasi-fiscal realm, then,
depends on the strength or weakness of the fiscal covenant.
Some prime examples of quasi-fiscal practices include rescue operations or bail-outs
in the face of exchange-rate crises and the granting of guarantees to private investors. Tax
expenditure and mandatory regulations are also common practices. Tax expenditure refers to
tax concessions of one sort or another —exemptions, preferential rates, deductions or
payment extensions— granted in consideration of expenditures undertaken by the private
sector. Because they are financed through a reduction of tax liability, they constitute indirect
subsidies or indirect public expenditures. Mandatory regulations refer to the replacement of
public expenditure with the legal obligation for private agents to provide or directly finance
the supply of a particular good or service, generally some form of social benefit for workers
or environmental protection measures. In contrast with tax expenditure, in this case an
additional tax is levied on the private agent, and the expenditure stipulated by law is charged
against it.
Mention should also be made of an additional factor that tends to generate
considerable opacity in fiscal accounts: the lack or poor quality of information (see
chapter V). Many countries have made substantial progress, particularly in response to
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macroeconomic crises, but much still remains to be done on this front. The problem affects
not only quasi-fiscal items, but also the fiscal accounts per se. Among the many
shortcomings observed in this area, the chief problems are inadequacies in the coverage,
consistency and intertemporal comparability of the available statistics; a tendency to measure
expenditure on a cash basis rather than an accrual basis; inadequate public debt accounting;
and an almost total absence of estimates of national wealth (assets, liabilities and net worth).
In order to enhance the transparency of public finances, two courses of action are
recommended:
(a) Cut down on quasi-fiscal practices by incorporating most operations of this
nature into the government budget or preparing supplementary budgets for tax
expenditure, mandatory regulations and guarantees
Reducing the scope of quasi-fiscal practices by including them in the government
budget is one means of improving the transparency of public finances. This approach allows
for greater macroeconomic control, proper analysis of the sectoral and distributional effects
of fiscal policy, suitable democratic controls and an overall view of the costs of the many
activities carried out by the State and the resources required to finance them. Once the fiscal
assistance that a given social, productive or regional sector receives is made explicit, it
becomes clearer whether it should be eliminated or provided by means of another policy
instrument. In this way, conferring greater transparency on these operations and refraining
from those for which there is little justification clears the ground for a debate on the financing
of those operations deemed legitimate, a debate that considers the technical efficacy of the
instruments chosen to pursue a specific public policy objective.
An alternative to the full integration of such operations in the budget is to prepare
supplementary budgets that can be submitted to the legislature as annexes. Such
supplementary budgets would cover three areas:
Tax expenditure: This would entail applying the practice adopted in Germany and
the United States in the late 1960s, and subsequently emulated by many OECD countries,
whereby the legislature is informed of the amounts, rationale and purposes of “tax
expenditures” generated through exemptions, preferential rates, deductions and deferment of
tax obligations. This procedure would also make it possible to rationalize these concessions.
They should, in any case, be authorized only under strict conditions and for limited periods;
they should not be automatically renewable, but subject to an evaluation of results.
Mandatory regulations: Bearing in mind that it is possible to achieve public policy
objectives not only through direct budgetary provision of public goods and services, but also
through private action mandated by regulation, it is appropriate to estimate the cost of the
latter to the private sector and record it as public expenditure financed out of earmarked
contributions. This procedure also facilitates an explicit analysis of the benefits that a variety
of social, productive or regional sectors receive directly or indirectly from public action and
the consideration of how to rationalize them.
SUMMARY 33
Guarantees: As mentioned above, estimates of the guarantees granted by public
entities in relation to infrastructure projects should be made regularly, and, where possible,
the actual amount of the equivalent “insurance” should be explicitly budgeted for. In addition
to the specific case of infrastructure projects aside, all public guarantees should be estimated
on a regular basis. In this regard, there is a particular  need to estimate the value of
contingent liabilities associated with pension systems on a regular basis. While the practice
of calculating the actuarial values of pensions provided by the State has been given a boost
by the social security reforms currently under way, this practice has not been extended to
estimates of contingent liabilities assumed by the State in connection with such reforms,
especially in the case of minimum pension guarantees.
It is worth emphasizing that the principle that the legislature should debate the full
range of fiscal policies implies that the Executive should submit with a breakdown of all
public finances, including the financial implication of actions taken by autonomous entities,
whether State-owned enterprises, or regional or local governments. Accordingly, this practice
should be adopted by those countries which have not yet done so.
(b) Redouble  efforts to improve fiscal information
This task has immense public significance, since it underlies not only
macroeconomic control, but also the efficacy and efficiency of government action. It is a
tribute to the strengthening of democratic values that there is a demand for the State to
present an accurate,  transparent and timely accounting of its activities to the community. As
explained above, this accounting should encompass both fiscal and quasi-fiscal activities and
include not only income statements, but also the public-sector balance sheet (assets,
liabilities, net worth). Of course, as a complement to this, the agencies responsible for
producing such information should be endowed with suitably qualified staff and technological
resources; in addition, there is a need to encourage academic debate on the major conceptual
issues underlying fiscal estimates (use of cash versus accrual accounting; measurement of the
value added by government activities; selection of indices to deflate expenditure series;
precise definition of certain types of expenditure, such as military spending; alternative
definitions of the deficit and estimation methods; method of reporting privatizations in fiscal
accounting; methods of estimating assets, liabilities and net worth; and, in that context,
methods of estimating contingent government liabilities).
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F.  SAFEGUARDING SOCIAL EQUITY
As was mentioned earlier, the need to assign top priority to the goal of macroeconomic
stabilization has, in recent decades, led to a relative neglect of other fiscal policy objectives,
particularly that of fostering social equity. As this study will show, efforts have to some
extent refocused on this objective in the 1990s, and this has been reflected in an upturn in
social spending in Latin America. However, this issue poses an enormous challenge to the
region, and will need to be tackled with greater determination in the immediate future.
Social expenditure is undoubtedly the most important tool used by Government to
influence income distribution (see chapter VI). There is, in fact, a great deal of evidence to
suggest that social expenditure has a significant impact on the secondary distribution of
income. In addition, over the long term, greater investment in human capital makes it possible
to influence one of the structural factors of income distribution. Studies indicate, in
particular, that allocating greater resources to education permits a better distribution of
human capital in society and may have a far greater impact on equity than has been estimated
in studies of short-term distributional effects.5
The data available on the secondary distribution of income in Latin America indicate
that, in absolute terms, higher-income groups are benefiting more from social expenditure.
However, as a proportion of the income of the various social strata, the subsidies channelled
through social expenditure to the poorest segments of the population are higher than for the
other segments. This overall pattern obscures the widely varying distributional effects of
different types of expenditure. As figure I-4 shows, spending on health care, primary
education and, to a lesser extent, secondary education achieves a high level of targeting of
the poor (i.e., the proportion of spending that benefits the poor in relation to the proportion of
the poor to the total population). In contrast, spending on social security and higher education
tends to be regressive. Spending on housing falls somewhere in between, as it chiefly benefits
middle-income strata. These data suggest that there is ample room for improving income
distribution through social expenditure, as well as for better targeting.
The means of financing such expenditure are not distributionally neutral, either.
Financing through direct taxes tends to be more progressive than financing through VAT, for
example. Just as importantly, inadequate revenues and consequent borrowing, by causing
inflation to accelerate, may cancel out any favourable redistributional effects. The effects of
revenue structure on income distribution, while less important than used to be thought, are by
no means negligible; nonetheless, they have come in for little scrutiny in academic circles in
recent decades. In this regard, the sharp decline in the relative importance of direct taxation in
Latin America, and especially of personal income tax (which quite possibly has the most
significant distributional effects), is cause for concern.
                                                
5 For more information, see recent editions of the “Social Panorama of Latin America and the
Caribbean”; see also Inter-American Development Bank (1997).
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Figure I-4
TARGETING OF SOCIAL EXPENDITURE ON THE POOR (INDICES)
Source: Prepared  on the basis of table VI-4.
Unfortunately, consideration of these topics is hampered by the dearth of studies on
the distributional effects of fiscal policy. While budgets are often prepared with an eye to
sound macroeconomic criteria, rarely is that exercise supplemented by calculations of the
distributional impact of various budget options, in part, no doubt, because of the technical
complexity of the task and the lack of information or studies on the subject. Almost no
country in the region has prepared sufficiently complete and up-to-date studies on tax
incidence, and only a few have conducted analyses of the incidence of expenditure, either at
the sectoral or aggregate levels. Consequently, there are still fewer studies on budget incidence
which measure the net distributional impact of fiscal policy.
Figure I-5 presents an outline of trends in social expenditure in Latin America and the
Caribbean over the past two decades. The 1980s were notable for a sharp reduction in social
investment. The decrease in the proportion of GDP devoted to social expenditure, coupled
with a decline in per capita income, led to a 24% drop in per capita social expenditure in Latin
America. During the 1990s, both these indicators have moved upward; by 1995 per capita
social expenditure in Latin America was already 18% higher than in the early 1980s. It should
be noted that the Caribbean has not shared in this positive trend in social expenditure;  there,
such  spending  has fluctuated at  around 9%-11% of  GDP since  1987, with the trend being
slightly downward, and per capita spending has continued to drop. Nonetheless, as a general
rule, public spending by the Caribbean countries remains higher than the average for Latin
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however, for three reasons. First, the priority given to social expenditure still varies widely
from one country to the next and, in many, social spending is still too low. Second, a very
substantial portion of the growth in social expenditure —especially in countries where such
spending is high— goes to social security, and specifically to pension payments, which is the
component with the least progressive distribution. The increase in expenditure on human
capital has also been lower than the above-mentioned figures suggest. In the case of
education, for instance, by 1995 real per capita expenditure in Latin America as a whole had
barely recovered to 1980 levels and in a number of countries was still below those levels.
Third, the sharp reduction in social expenditure in the 1980s and its rebound in the 1990s is
largely a reflection of the region’s macroeconomic cycle and thus is symptomatic of the
procyclical pattern of trends in social spending.
Some of the reforms designed to increase the efficiency of social expenditure have had
worrisome distributional effects that need to be examined closely. There is, in fact, evidence
that when decentralization is carried out without adequate safeguards, the process can have a
serious impact on equity among subnational units. Thus, in some of the cases for which
comparable data are available (for example, education in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico), there
is evidence that dispersion of service quality has tended to increase (see chapter VIII).
Unfortunately, consideration of these topics is hampered by the dearth of studies on
the distributional effects of fiscal policy. While budgets are often prepared with an eye to
sound macroeconomic criteria, rarely is that exercise supplemented by calculations of the
distributional impact of various budget options, in part, no doubt, because of the technical
complexity of the task and the lack of information or studies on the subject. Almost no
country in the region has prepared sufficiently complete and up-to-date studies on tax
incidence, and only a few have conducted analyses of the incidence of expenditure, either at
the sectoral or aggregate levels. Consequently, there are still fewer studies on budget incidence
which measure the net distributional impact of fiscal policy.
Figure I-5 presents an outline of trends in social expenditure in Latin America and the
Caribbean over the past two decades. The 1980s were notable for a sharp reduction in social
investment. The decrease in the proportion of GDP devoted to social expenditure, coupled
with a decline in per capita income, led to a 24% drop in per capita social expenditure in Latin
America. During the 1990s, both these indicators have moved upward; by 1995 per capita
social expenditure in Latin America was already 18% higher than in the early 1980s. It should
be noted that the Caribbean has not shared in this positive trend in social expenditure;  there,
such  spending  has fluctuated at  around 9%-11% of  GDP since  1987, with the trend being
slightly downward, and per capita spending has continued to drop. Nonetheless, as a general
rule, public spending by the Caribbean countries remains higher than the average for Latin
America. This positive picture for Latin America must be viewed with some reservations,
however, for three reasons. First, the priority given to social expenditure still varies widely
from one country to the next and, in many, social spending is still too low. Second, a very
substantial portion of the growth in social expenditure —especially in countries where such
spending is high— goes to social security, and specifically to pension payments, which is the
component with the least progressive distribution. The increase in expenditure on human
capital has also been lower than the above-mentioned figures suggest. In the case of
education, for instance, by 1995 real per capita expenditure in Latin America as a whole had
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barely recovered to 1980 levels and in a number of countries was still below those levels.
Third, the sharp reduction in social expenditure in the 1980s and its rebound in the 1990s is
largely a reflection of the region’s macroeconomic cycle and thus is symptomatic of the
procyclical pattern of trends in social spending.
Some of the reforms designed to increase the efficiency of social expenditure have had
worrisome distributional effects that need to be examined closely. There is, in fact, evidence
that when decentralization is carried out without adequate safeguards, the process can have a
serious impact on equity among subnational units. Thus, in some of the cases for which
comparable data are available (for example, education in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico), there
is evidence that dispersion of service quality has tended to increase (see chapter VIII).
Similarly, reforms designed to increase the opportunities for private management of
service delivery may have adverse effects if they are not accompanied by appropriate
altruistic, or “solidarity”, mechanisms; an example of this is Chile’s private health-care
system. Under these conditions, such reforms may encourage “skimming”, or adverse
selection of users; this occurs when users with higher incomes and lower age-related health
risks are concentrated in the private system, while people of lower incomes and high-risk age
groups are concentrated in the public system. Such a scheme, far from reducing the demand
for public resources in the sector, may actually increase it (see chapter VII).
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Figure I-5
TRENDS IN PUBLIC SOCIAL EXPENDITURE:
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
(As a percentage of GDP)
                  Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
In line with these observations, the following courses of action are recommended:
(a) Encourage studies and regular estimates of the distributional impact of fiscal
policy
The reasonable concern for ensuring the non-inflationary balancing of public
accounts needs to be complemented by a similar interest in the impact of public policies on
social equity. This entails special attention to analysis of the distributional impact of fiscal
policy through up-to-date studies on tax incidence on different socio-economic strata and a
wider diffusion of studies that examine the effects of public expenditure, both in the
aggregate and, in particular, with respect to programmes specifically targeted at lower-income
groups. Such studies should provide the basis for estimates of budget incidence, i.e., the net
distributional effects of the budget. Just as Governments and many analysts calculate the
macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy, so too its distributional effects should be estimated
on a regular basis. This exercise is especially necessary when the legislature must take
important decisions in this sphere, i.e., on major changes in the tax structure or the
composition of public spending. Analysis of the distributional impact should be one of the
main criteria for taking the decision. Such analyses should also consider all areas of quasi-
fiscal activity, especially tax expenditure and mandatory regulations.














In view of the importance of the distributional effects of social expenditure, the
recovery in the levels of such expenditure in Latin America should be consolidated and the
negative trend seen in the countries of the Caribbean should be halted. Social expenditure
should be accorded higher fiscal priority in quantit tive terms, while a drive should be
undertaken to rationalize expenditure by eliminating or reducing unnecessary administrative
expenses and improving the targeting of its benefits. The latter requires not only emphasizing
expenditure that has greater redistributional effects, but also designing mechanisms that make
it possible to minimize or even reverse the regressive nature of some types of expenditure.
Just as importantly in terms of avoiding the trauma caused by the procyclical pattern of
social expenditure, such spending needs to be given special priority in initiatives aimed at
stabilizing public expenditure.
(c) Restore emphasis on the importance of direct taxation, especially personal
income tax, for reasons of equity as well as other motives
For reasons of both revenue enhancement and social equity, greater emphasis should
be placed on direct taxes (especially personal income tax), which are more progressive in
their distributional impact. The negative effects of indirect taxation in terms of the simplicity
of the tax system and its administration have been analysed in detail elsewhere. With respect
to equity, the possibility of applying differential rates for indirect taxes —with lower rates on
some staples prominent in the basic shopping basket of the poor— should not be ruled out,
so long as technical and administrative safeguards are in place to avoid linkage or marked
distortions in resource allocation. Another option that should at least be considered is the
transparent use of cross-subsidies on public services, provided they do not generate
distortions in the setting of the basic price of the service or cause any considerable
substitution effect that would increase the consumption of goods and services that are more
socially costly.
(d) Monitor the effects of decentralization on social equity
Explicit redistributional criteria should govern the design of schemes for transferring
the funding of social expenditure to subnational levels of governments. Moreover, in
providing institutional support to local governments and monitoring decentralization, care
should be taken to ensure that the process does not lead to greater dispersion in coverage and
quality among different areas of a country.
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(e) Incorporate specific altruistic mechanisms in the design of schemes for
private-sector involvement in social services
In designing schemes for private-sector involvement in the delivery of social
services, special emphasis should be placed on altruistic mechanisms in order to prevent
adverse selection. Systems for informing users about the alternative service available and
mechanisms of quality control are also needed to protect lower-income groups, in particular.
G.  STRENGTHENING THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
OF DEMOCRACY
Public finances are at the heart of the democratic process. It is a well-known fact that
legislatures arose in the modern era out of a desire to curb the power of the monarch to levy
taxes and control the revenues collected. That historical consideration aside, there is perhaps
no issue that galvanizes citizens’ interest more than knowing how they will be taxed and what
use will be made of their contributions.
In an era where democracy is fortunately taking firm hold in the region, fiscal
institutions must also evolve within an institutional framework imbued with the principles of
participation and the separation of powers. There are understandable reservations concerning
the democratic system’s ability to meet expectations regarding public spending without
generating macroeconomic imbalances; there are numerous cases in the region that appear to
justify those reservations. However, it is also clear that the lack of a democratic consensus
regarding the fiscal covenant usually leads to undesirable practices: an increase in quasi-
fiscal operations which reduce the transparency of fiscal policy, with the consequences
already noted (see chapter II); and budgetary rigidities stemming from earmarked rents,
demanded by groups unhappy with the Executive or the legislature, in order to force the
fiscal authorities to undertake specific actions (see chapter IV).
In designing fiscal institutions, three considerations need to be taken into account.
First, institutions should meet multiple objectives, with the following as a minimum: (i) they
should provide for levels of revenue and expenditure that are compatible with
macroeconomic balance and growth; (ii) they should ensure that resources are used in
accordance with plans of government resulting from the democratic process; and (iii) they
should offer incentives for suitable resource use. Second, they should take into account all
the social actors involved: the national Executive, subnational levels of governments,
autonomous public entities, the legislature, regulatory agencies and civil society. Third, it is
also important to consider informal institutions, i.e., patterns of behaviour, implicit rules and
customs. Unlike formal institutions, which can be modified by law or administrative reform,
informal institutions are necessarily the result of a lengthy process of evolution.
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The institution-building process undertaken in the region in the last few decades
provides only a partial response to these multiple requirements. In general, the emphasis has
been on strengthening the formal institutions of the national Executive, on which
responsibility for achieving the first of these objectives has been placed, that is, the
achievement of macroeconomic equilibria through the management of public finances. This
has been the aim of efforts to strengthen departments or ministries of finance and autonomous
central banks, tax offices, integrated financial administration systems and private research
centres or similar institutions which monitor macroeconomic management. However, since
these efforts are not part of a broader process geared to generating consensus on the value of
such practices, they rarely trickle down to informal institutions and indeed even encourage
counter-productive practices: constant confrontations within the Executive and between the
Executive and the legislature, attempts by dissatisfied elements in the Executive or the
legislature branches to find quasi-fiscal loopholes for escaping controls, and the creation of
earmarked rents or revenues specifically in order to tie the hands of the fiscal authorities.
Measures to create autonomous fiscal authorities, rather than providing a solution, have
merely added to the problem.
The emerging trend in institution-building which seeks to foster a results-based
public administrative culture relates to the third objective mentioned above, i.e., offering
incentives for suitable resource use; unlike the previous objective, it chiefly concerns
informal institutions. Paradoxically, however, this trend coincides with the maintenance of
formal fiscal oversight institutions still employing antiquated methods that run counter to this
aim, and with the virtual dismantling of most national public investment systems; as a result,
the emphasis is on efficiency in terms of current rather than capital expenditure (see chapter
X). As pointed out earlier, decentralization also tends to promote fulfilment of this objective,
but when the process is poorly designed, it can upset the macroeconomic balance. On the
other hand, a decentralization plan that maintains excessive central control in order to avoid
this problem may end up undermining the autonomy necessary for efficient management.
The dismantling of national public investment systems is part of a generalized
emasculation of the planning agencies that used to administer them and is reflected in the
paradoxical lack of institutions to oversee the attainment of the second of these objectives:
consistency between budget appropriations and government priorities. If this function is
assigned to the Ministry of Finance, i.e., to the institution whose basic purpose is, by
definition, to achieve the first objective, then the second objective may be treated as a matter
of lower priority. The preferred option in some cases is to assign this role to the Office of the
President or the Office of the Prime Minister, but in this case the political functions of such
offices must not be allowed to obscure this specifically fiscal role.
The problems are even more acute when other actors are involved. With very few
exceptions, there is a marked asymmetry between the fiscal structure of national and
subnational levels of governments. Moreover, the lack of qualified technical support for the
legislature prevents it from functioning as an effective counterpart to the fiscal authority and
the Executive in general, and hence from fulfilling its role with respect to the above three
objectives. This and the fact that civil society’s potential for fiscal analysis remains largely
undeveloped (except for the handful of centres for macroeconomic analysis referred to
earlier) reduce the budget debate to a mere formality, lacking any real substance, which thus
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contributes little to deepening the social consensus on which a solid fiscal covenant and a
stronger democracy may be built.
In addition to the foregoing, the obvious bears repeating, namely, that the budget
exercise is a dynamic process, in which decisions are adopted at different stages as new
information emerges and new problems come to the attention of authorities. Apart from the
necessary flexibility that this demands, the importance of an appropriate information system
for the proper functioning of any budgetary institution cannot be overemphasized. There is
nothing, in fact, so disruptive from the institutional standpoint as major surprises resulting
from a deficient information system —as finding out, for example, that certain (quasi-fiscal)
expenditures or hidden liabilities (unreported debts, uncalculated contingent liabilities or
unestimated pension liabilities) have thrown the accounts so out of balance that the political
agreements that are the foundation for any budget at any given time must be rebuilt all over
again.
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that it is necessary to:
(a) Promote the development of balanced and democratic fiscal institutions
The institutions to be developed should fulfil the three objectives identified above,
permit the participation of all the actors involved and attempt to influence informal norms and
practices. This entails, as initial steps, strengthening the Executive agencies that monitor
consistency between the distribution of fiscal, resources and government plans, and instituting
practices that contribute to proper resource management. Second, it entails providing more
technical support to the weakest actors in the budget process: subnational levels of
governments, legislatures and civil society. Lastly, attention should be paid not only to
formal institutions, but also to the host of informal rules and practices, a sphere in which
public debate and democratic consensus-building are indispensable.
(b) Improve the information flows essential to the proper operation of fiscal
institutions
The above-mentioned initiatives for enhancing fiscal information resources are thus
essential in order to ensure not only transparency of public action, but also the proper
operation of fiscal institutions.
